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Abstract
A significant portion of early language learn-
ing can be viewed as an associative learning
problem. We investigate the use of associative
language learning based on the principle that
words convey Shannon information about the
environment. We discuss the shortcomings
in representation used by previous associative
word learners and propose a functional repre-
sentation that not only denotes environmen-
tal categories, but serves as the basis for ac-
tivities and interaction with the environment.
We present experimental results with an au-
tonomous agent acquiring language.
1. Introduction
All language learning is concerned with the proper
use of words and phrases. Early first-language learn-
ing is particularly focused on learning words that
can be used to refer to the immediate environment
(objects, relations, events and processes) or used in
simple social activities (expressions, requests, etc.).
The early first-language learner is faced with the
challenge of determining both what the usable units
of language are (words and eventually grammatical
constructs) as well as the appropriate contexts of
their use. We propose that a significant portion of
this early language learning problem can be viewed
as an associative learning problem, where the lan-
guage learner is learning the associations between
represented contexts for use (perceptual categories,
representations of event structure, etc.) and verbal
patterns (discovering word boundaries and the or-
dered structure of words in sentences). Furthermore,
linguistic behavior observed by the learner – the
data available to it – conveys information, in Shan-
non’s information-theoretic sense, about contexts of
use (as perceptual states, internal states, and repre-
sentations of processes) and this information-bearing
property may be exploited by an associative learner.
Associative learning is the acquisition of meanings
through the observation of the co-occurence of the
words and an example of their meaning. We define
associative learner as one which learns a map f :
W → Φ, where W is a set of words and phrases, and
Φ is the set of the learner’s perceptual primitives.
Associative learning is a natural technique for
mapping words to their meanings because it does
not require the learning agent to have any a priori
knowledge of the world save the ability to form as-
sociations. Associative learning may not explain all
language learning, but it is a necessary tool to boot-
strap later, more sophisticated lexical development.
The representation of both words and meaning
greatly influences what can be learned. Previous
associative word learning systems (Section 2.) have
mapped individual words to their meanings. How-
ever, very few words have meanings which are not
dependent upon their larger context in a phrase or
sentence. To broaden the scope of the meanings we
might learn, and in contrast to other learners which
mapped single word-tokens to meanings, our learner
considers the meanings of words in context (Section
3.2). Previous associative learners have also mapped
words to their denotational meanings, that is, a de-
scription of raw sensor input. Although denotational
meanings can be used for passive recognition, the
learner cannot use the meanings for performing ac-
tions. We are interested in constructing learning
systems capable of autonomous behavior and ac-
tive learning. Such a learner must learn functional
meanings (Section 3.) allowing it to model a word’s
meaning. Functional meanings are motivated by the
notion of a word’s functional semantics, and work
in cognitive-psychology which indicates that men-
tal models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) are a significant
part of our understanding of language. Mental mod-
els suggest that the meanings learned by our agent
should be based upon structured perception of the
environment by the learner (Section 3.1) rather than
clusters of raw sensor values.
To explore these ideas empirically, we have devel-
oped a phrase-learning system which uses the Multi-
Stream Dependency Detection (MSDD) algorithm
(Oates et al., 1999), (Section 4.1). MSDD ranks as-
sociations between tokens based on the G statis-
tic, an information-theoretic criterion derivable from
from mutual information. Using this learning system
our mobile robot was able to learn a moderate-sized
vocabulary of phrases which describe a set of its ac-
tions (Section 5.).
2. Related Work
There has been a great deal of machine learning fo-
cused on natural language processing. Here we de-
scribe work that has focused on unsupervised acqui-
sition of word meaning by an autonomous agent.
Oates (Oates et al., 1999) used mutual informa-
tion to cluster words which have similar syntactic
structure. Meaning is attributed to these clusters
of words by estimating the probability that some
cluster of words co-occurs with a sensory experience.
Meanings are represented as clustered time series of
the robot’s raw sensors.
This work was later expanded by Oates
(Oates, 2001) in the PERUSE algorithm which
segmented raw speech data rather than textual
descriptions. PERUSE finds patterns by running a
window over the sound signal for each utterance and
finding portions of this pattern in other utterances.
It then fits a Gaussian temporal model to the
patterns, learning the parameters using Expectation
Maximization. Once words are identified, they
are tagged. A separate algorithm estimates the
conditional probability that the word would be
uttered given a certain set of sensor values.
In Steels’ (Steels, 1996) talking heads experiment,
interacting agents evolve a language to accomplish
a communication task. The agents randomly gener-
ated nonsense words and then negotiated their mean-
ing with the other agent. The words in this language
denoted specific areas on a scene which both agents
were viewing. In contrast to any human language,
none of the words in the language were context de-
pendent. Each had a single meaning which was some
descriptive attribute of the scene, for example (size
tall). Although “tall” is highly contextualized in
English, in this work it was a specific category, pro-
grammatically defined. There was no model of the
environment in the representation. The structure of
the experiment, a game where the agents took turns
telling the each other which element in a scene should
be examined, was such that denotational meanings
were sufficient to play the game and structured rep-
resentations of the world were unnecessary.
In later work, (Steels and Kaplan, 2001), a robot
plays a game with a human where it learns to as-
sociate the names of three objects with their per-
ceptual representation. Associations are learned us-
ing reinforcement learning. The words are obtained
from raw speech using off-the-shelf speech recogni-
tion software. The perceptions of the environment
are clusters of simplified color histograms.
Deb Roy (Roy, 2000) built a system which found
correspondences between utterances and visual in-
put. The utterances were represented as phoneme
probabilities matched with hidden markov models of
phoneme transitions. Objects were represented as
collections of histograms of both color and shape in-
formation. The agent was exposed to a series of dis-
tinct visual/auditory experiences. The agent main-
tained a queue of five of these experiences. When-
ever at least two of the experiences in the queue
were considered to be the same, the agent stored the
utterance-visual pairing in its long term memory. At
the end of the experiement the agent rated it’s pair-
ings by the mutual information between utterance
and observation.
In all of this work, the meanings which are learned
are denotational. Words are mapped to raw sensor
data (via clusters, or other abstraction) for the pur-
poses of recognizing objects/scenes. Partially this is
a result of a focus in previous work on learning nouns,
and the goal has been discrimination of the envi-
ronment. Machine learning of linguistic constructs
requiring richer representational structure, such as
that described in the mental model literature, has
not yet been addressed.
Jeff Siskind has done the work which is most
closely related to the concept of functional mean-
ings. His Abigail (Siskind, 1993) system learned to
recocognize various event types described by pred-
icate logic where the predicates were simple phys-
ical primitives. The system had a “imagination”
which allowed it to make hypothesis about the fu-
ture of the environment given its current condition.
In contrast to our work, Abigail was a recognition
system. Although it could simulate the world it
could not behave pro-actively in it. Siskind’s later
work (Siskind, 2000) focused on building an algo-
rithm which was an adequate explanation of chil-
dren’s word learning which addressed, among other
things, the multi-word learning problem which is re-
lated to contextualized meanings for words.
3. Implications of the Structure of
Meaning
Words contain Shannon information which can be
harnessed to learn their meanings. The structure of
the meanings we learn has a significant impact on
the uses to which the meanings can be put, and, ob-
viously, what meanings can be learned. These issues
are addressed in the following.
In the last section, we discussed the denotational
meanings used by previous associative word learn-
ers. However, a great deal of psychological evidence
suggests that much of meaning, especially com-
plex meaning, is based upon a mental model which
goes far beyond a denotational token. Research
shows that by the time they begin to use words,
children represent the structure of events and pro-
cesses, in addition to tracking objects (Bruner, 1983,
Nelson, 1986, Tomasello, 1992). Even the meaning
of simple word like “cup” is not denotational. While
the cluster of sensor inputs which indicates the class
of appearances we might label “cup” is a part of the
word’s meaning, a far more important part of the
meaning of “cup” is the knowledge that liquid, when
poured into a “cup” will not run out all over our laps.
Denotational meanings might allow a learner to say
“cup” when one is presented to it, functional mean-
ings allow the learner to drink (and more). Further,
the learner’s ability to model its meanings allows it
to take a pro-active role in the learning process. It
can say “I’m going to move forward now” and then
do so, rather than simply waiting to be told that it
has moved forward. Pro-active learning is closely re-
lated to the language games discussed in Steels and
elsewhere.
3.1 Functional Meanings and Mental Mod-
els
Many psychologists have proposed that
a large component of language compre-
hension is based upon mental models
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, Gentner and Stevens, 1983).
Speaking loosely, a mental model is a representation
which contains what a word is “about” rather than
the word itself. Denotational meanings do not
consist of what the word is “about.” Denotational
meaning is simply a mapping between a word and
some token. An especially clear example of this in
previous work is Steels’ talking heads whose learned
meanings are the ability to perform a substitution
of a perceptual token for a heard word.
There is, however, very little consensus as to the
essential nature of the model itself. In our work, we
have and intend to use models that seem necessary.
We do not claim that they are complete, minimal, or
even those actually present in humans. Further, it
is our belief that many of these models are learned.
Our purpose in implementing them for the learner
is to facilitate more complex learning rather than to
demonstrate the necessity of their presence a priori
in a word learning system.
Functional meaning is grounded in control struc-
tures that allow the agent to act appropriately in
the environment – e.g., with respect to an object or
event. An example of such a control structure is a
planning operator, which provides conditions for the
appropriateness of an action to achieve some goal.
When the functional representation of a phrase has
been successfully learned, the agent can use the map-
ping of the word to action system or operator to ei-
ther act appropriately or internally model the word’s
meaning.
Figure 1: A hypothetical learning environment for a mo-
bile robot
3.2 Learning Phrases Rather than Words
Previous work has focused upon learning the denota-
tional meaning of individual words. However, learn-
ing meanings for individual words outside of context
limits the concepts which can be learned.
Consider an agent trying to learn the meaning
of three simple actions: turning left ninety degrees,
turning right ninety degrees and staying still. Sup-
pose further, that the agent’s actions take place in
an environment where to the left of the agent lies a
sphere and to the right a cube. Figure 1 shows this
hypothetical situation.
Suppose the robot’s actions are chosen at random.
When it chooses turn left it receives the descrip-
tion “The robot turned left.” When it turns right
it receives the description “The robot turned right.”
When it stays still, it receives the description “The
robot sits still with a cube to the right and a sphere
to the left.” Given this data, and a bag of words rep-
resentation of the utterances, an associative learner
cannot learn the meaning of “left” or “right.” There
is no statistical correlation between turning left and
the word “left” nor between the sphere present to the
left. This occurs of course because the meanings are
different depending on how it used in the sentence,
e.g. “turned left” and “turned right” versus “to the
left” and “to the right.”
The lesson of this example is that if we are inter-
ested in capturing this meaning, we must consider
words in context, not just words individually. Al-
though the importance of syntactic context has long
been recognized by linguists working in formal se-
mantics, previous work in agent-based associative
learning, as cited earlier, has not taken this into ac-
count. However such context must be considered for
even simple understanding of acting in the world.
Of course, considering whole sentences makes the
associative learning task quite difficult. One need
only compare Hemingway and Faulkner to see that
two sentences carrying essentially the same meaning
may vary greatly in size and structure. To simplify
the problem, but maintain our ability to learn con-
textualized meanings, we have chosen to encode our
phrases as (subject, verb, object) triples. This rep-
resentation is analogous to a simplified case frame.
The associations that we learn consist of a mapping
from tuple to experience. Each element of the tuple
is either a specific word or the wildcard symbol ’*’ in-
dicating that the meaning of the phrase remains con-
stant for any substitution for the wildcard. Although
this representation is greatly simplified in compari-
son to natural language sentences, it contains enough
context to greatly expand the meanings we can learn.
4. Associative Word Learning
through Mutual Information
In order to use the information which words con-
vey about the environment to learn their meanings,
we need an information-theoretic learning algorithm.
We have chosen to use the Multi-Stream Dependency
Detection algorithm (MSDD) developed by Oates et
al (Oates et al., 1999). The MSDD algorithm uses
the G statistic to learn associations. As we show be-
low, the G statistic is directly related to the Shannon
mutual information between two distributions.
4.1 MSDD
The MSDD algorithm (Oates et al., 1999) finds de-
pendencies between vectors of tokens. The training
data is a set of pairs < ~x, ~y >, where ~x and ~y are
token vectors that need not have the same length.
Often, MSDD has been used to find patterns in mul-
tivariate categorical time series, in which case the
training pairs ~x and ~y would be samples from the
time series separated by some lag.
MSDD outputs a set of a patterns. Each pattern
has the form < ~p, ~q >, where each pi, qi can be either
a token that occurred in the training data or the
wildcard symbol ∗. A pattern vector ~p matches an
input vector ~q when for all i, either xi = pi or pi = ∗.
An MSDD pattern < ~p, ~q > is interpreted as, for a
pair < ~x, ~y >, if ~x matches ~p, then ~y matches ~q more
often than would be expected by chance.
MSDD evaluates candidate patterns using contin-
gency tables. For a pattern < ~p, ~q >, let O(P,Q)
be the number of pairs where ~x matches ~p and ~y
matches ~q. Let O(P,¬Q) be the number of pairs
where ~x matches ~p and ~y does not match ~q, T1 be
the statement that ~x matches ~p, and let T2 be the
statement that ~y matches ~q, then MSDD evaluates
the pattern by constructing the contingency table
shown in Figure 1.
T1 ¬T1
T2 O(P,Q) O(¬P,Q)
¬T2 O(P,¬Q) O(¬P,¬Q)
Table 1: An example contingency table used by the
MSDD algorithm
If the G statistic for this contingency table is sig-
nificant then we can dismiss the null hypothesis that
T1 and T2 are independent and we can conclude that
there is a statistical association between T1 and T2.
Obviously, the space of possible patterns is quite
large. In order to obtain a solution in a reasonable
amount of computation, the MSDD algorithm begins
with T1 and T2 filled entirely with wildcards. It then
proceeds with a guided search down the tree which is
built by expanding patterns. Paterns are expanded
by changing a wildcard into its possible values. This
search tree is pruned by bounds on the G statistic.
4.2 Relating G to Mutual Information
The MSDD algorithm uses the G statistic to select
word associations. We have noted that the G statis-
tic is an information-theoretic measure. In the fol-
lowing we show that MSDD’s ranking of associations
by the G statistic is equivalent to ranking them by
mutual information.
Suppose we have a sample drawn from the joint
distribution of two random variables X and Y . Let
O(x, y) be the observed count for the pair (x, y), t be
the total number of observations and E(x, y) be the
expected count under the hypothesis that X and Y
are unrelated, that is:
E(x, y) =
(
∑
xO(x, y))
(∑
y O(x, y)
)
t
Then G is defined as:
G = 2
∑
x
∑
y
O(x, y) log
O(x, y)∑
y
O(x,y)×
∑
x
O(x,y)
t
= 2t
∑
x
∑
y
O(x, y)
t
log
O(x,y)
t∑
y
O(x,y)
t ×
∑
x
O(x,y)
t
≈ 2t
∑
x
∑
y
P (x, y) log
P (x, y)
P (x)× P (y)
≈ 2tMI(x, y).
So G is twice the sample size times the mutual in-
formation. As long as t is kept constant, maximizing
G is equivalent to maximizing mutual information.
The total number of observations is constant for any
pair of tokens associated by MSDD, because there is
a fixed number of pairs of observations in a data-set,
and each of them fall into one of the four table cells
for any pair of tokens. Therefore, any ranking of as-
sociations based upon the G statistic is equivalent to
a ranking based upon mutual information.
5. Empirical Examination
5.1 Experimental Set-up
To test for evidence of Shannon information in words
and to see how it might guide word learning, we ran
an experiment on a Pioneer II mobile robot (Figure
2). The Pioneer II was given five primitive actions
which it could perform: moving forward, moving
backward, turning left ninety degrees, turning right
ninety degrees and sitting still. Nine digital movies
(two of each action except sitting still) were recorded.
While the robot was engaged in each action, its
perceptual system recorded the following perceptual
vector (heading-delta position-delta). heading-delta
and position-delta were each one of the values: nega-
tive, zero, positive. These perceptions were not just
denotational tokens. The agent could use a vector
such as (positive zero) to perform a ninety-degree
turn. A series of vectors such as ((positive zero) (zero
positive) (negative zero) (zero positive)) constitute a
plan which the agent could use to perform planned
action. In this case a movement through a doorway
and turning into a hall.
Each movie of the robot acting was shown to be-
tween eight and twelve people. Each person wrote a
textual description of the movies, for example: “The
robot rotates ninety degrees and stops, facing away
from the viewer.” Each of these textual descriptions
were manually processed into (subject, verb, object)
tuples. This resulted in eighty-one descriptions with
a vocabulary of sixty different words; three words
for subject (mostly “robot”), thirty-nine verbs and
nineteen objects (including some tuples with a nil
object).
MSDD was run on the data to find associations
between phrases and perception vectors. We used
MSDD with k-best tree pruning, where search pro-
ceeds breadth first through the space of associations
until expanding a new level of the tree does not re-
sult in any changes to the k-best associations already
found. Since all of the observations were actions, we
also required that a verb be present in any of the
associations which were learned.
5.2 Results
When MSDD was run to find the thirty best patterns
it found the associations shown in Table 2. Twenty-
seven are listed: Three other associations found are
not shown because they are subsumed by others that
are listed.
Afterward, the agent was given phrases such as
“robot turns left” and “robot is moving forward”
and was asked to replicate the correct behaviour in-
dicated by the term. Since the agent had access to
meanings which could be turned into actions (as de-
scribed above), the entered phrase could easily be
mapped to the agent’s perceptual vector. With the
perceptual vector in hand the agent could success-
fully produce the corresponding behaviour. Likewise
since the agent maintained a short term memory of
its past actions it could generate the phrases which
corresponded to its previous actions.
Sensor Value Phrases Associated
(heading position)
(zero positive) “* moves *”, “* moving forward”,
“* moves forward”, “* moving *”
(zero negative) “* * backward”, “* backed *”,
“* backs *”
(zero zero) “* idles *”, “* resting *”,
“* stays *”, “* sleeps *”,
“* motionless *”, “* standing *”
(positive zero) “* turning right”, “* turning *”,
“* turning clockwise”,
”* turns clockwise”
(negative zero) “* turning left”, “* spinning left”,
“* turns counter-clockwise”,
“* turns left”, “* turns *”
(* zero) “* turns *”, “* turning *”
“* rotates *”
(zero *) “* moves *”, “* moving *”
Table 2: Mapping of words associated with sensor values
5.3 Discussion
The first thing that is interesting to note is that the
subject is always wildcarded in the learned phrases.
This is unsurprising given that seventy-nine out of
the eighty-one descriptions collected used “robot” as
the subject. As a result, the subject was never closely
correlated with any particular action. Obviously this
is a byproduct of the robot being the subject in all of
the actions. In the future we expect that exposure
to situations where the subject varies will produce
phrases whose meanings are distringuished by their
subject.
Also of note are the rules for (* zero) and (zero
*). In both cases these meanings indicate that the
agent has the knowledge that (valid in this environ-
ment) turning means not moving forward and mov-
ing means not turning. However, these rules indicate
a weakness in the MSDD algorithm’s ability to learn
associations. MSDD is forced to choose between a
wildcard or a specific symbol. It would be prefer-
able for the system to learn (non-zero zero) maps to
“* turns *”, where non-zero means a value of nega-
tive or positive. This type of expansion of MSDD’s
generalization abilities is an area that ought to be
explored.
Although by and large the associations
learned by MSDD are accurate meanings, three:
(* moves *) → (zero positive)
(* turning *) → (positive zero)
(* turns *) → (negative zero)
are incorrect. In each of these cases the meanings
learned, while accurate, are overly specific. This is
because the human annotators used “moves” much
more often with “forward” than “backward”. For
moving backward, they were more likely to use
Figure 2: The robot engaged in the left turn action
“backs”, “backing”, etc. Likewise, “turns” was used
with “left”, while “turning” was used with right.
These results are symptomatic of the very real
problem that accidental correlation can (and most
likely will) occur. This is an instance of over-fitting,
a problem which plagues nearly all learning. In
meaning acquisition, one potential solution is the
addition of hypothesis testing by the learner, or a
language game such as those proposed by Steels to
provide a mediator to aid the learning system in
correcting misinterpretations.
6. Conclusions
Information can be exploited by a learning algorithm
to associate words with meanings. To learn mean-
ings which are subsequently useful to the learning
system, it is preferable to learn functional meanings
rather than the denotational meanings which have
been the focus of previous associative word learn-
ers. Functional meanings are also consistent with
the theories of mental models developed in psychol-
ogy. Functional meanings necessitate a learner with
structured perception of the environment since ac-
quired functional meanings must hang on a frame-
work which can capture an action’s potential effects
on the world. More complex meanings also necessi-
tate the association of phrases rather than words to
meanings.
Initial experimental results show our agent is ca-
pable of learning functional meanings of phrases de-
scribing a subset of its actions.
6.1 Future Work
There are many ways we plan to expand this work.
Initially we have dealt only with primitive actions on
the part of the robot. We would like to expand this to
include more complex planned actions. Additionally
we see language as a tool that allows an agent to plan
its actions. For example, a statement like “come here
and pick this up” implicitly encodes a plan if you
have a meaning for “come here” and “pick this up.”
Like Steels, we believe that a language game is im-
portant for successful language acquisition, because
they provide a tight feedback loop which directly cor-
relates an agent’s success or failure in the game to
success or failure in language acquisition. Further
the language game can necessitate the development
of functional meanings, since a game can be designed
which an agent using denotational meanings cannot
play successfully.
We are working to increase the complexity of vo-
cabulary and sentence grammar, as well as the com-
plexity of activities. Our eventual goal is an account
of full language development in a robotic platform.
Along the way, we hope to identify the limits of as-
sociative language learning, seeing how such learning
scales in the face of greater demands.
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